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Abstract
Cutting out the intermediary and selling directly to consumers is an increasingly common
strategy by manufacturers in many industries. We develop a structural model of verti-
cal relations where manufacturers both bargain with retailers over wholesale prices and
sell their products directly to consumers. We show that direct sales by manufacturers
generate two effects that have opposing impact on welfare. First, direct sales gener-
ate potential welfare gains to consumers downstream due to additional competition and
product variety. Second, in the upstream, there is an increase in the bargaining leverage
of the manufacturers selling directly to consumers. Negotiated wholesale prices increase,
thus increasing final prices to consumers and decreasing consumer welfare. We show how
our model can be used to quantify the bargaining leverage and welfare effects of direct
sales. We estimate our model using data from the outdoor advertising industry and use
the estimated model to simulate counterfactual scenarios to isolate these effects. We
conclude by discussing the relevance of the bargaining leverage effect for vertical merger
evaluation.
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1 Introduction
When analyzing the negotiation of wholesale prices, most of the literature assumes that manu-
facturers cannot sell directly to consumers. In recent years there has been an increase in these
type of direct sales to consumers as discussed below. Such increase has motivated a number
of recent studies, described in the related literature, investigating the competitive effects of
direct-to-consumer sales by manufacturers. Most of these papers are theoretical. At the same
time, competition authorities have emphasized the importance of allowing consumers to choose
between manufacturers and retailers, and the anticompetitive impact of prohibiting direct-to-
consumer sales by manufacturers. Yet there are remarkably few empirical studies investigating
the impact of direct-to-consumer sales on welfare, and its implications for market power and
merger evaluation. This paper develops a structural model where manufacturers bargain with
retailers over wholesale prices and can sell directly to consumers, estimates the model using
a rich dataset from the outdoor advertising industry and uses the estimated model to quan-
tify both the effects of direct-to-consumer sales by manufacturers on welfare and bargaining
outcomes, and to evaluate policy interventions in the industry.
Direct sales to consumers by manufacturers have increased across a wide range of indus-
tries. Examples include Apple and Microsoft, selling their products directly in their stores
in addition to using retailers such as Best Buy and Walmart; Nike and Adidas, selling their
products directly online in addition to using retailers such as Foot Locker and Macy’s; and
television networks, like HBO and ESPN, selling their content directly through their online
platforms, HBO Now and ESPN+, in addition of selling their content to cable companies such
as Comcast and Time Warner Cable. The increase in direct sales to consumers has been facili-
tated by the internet through own-developed online platforms; trading platforms like Amazon,
eBay, or Taobao; social media like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram; and the internet search
advertising market, where online publishers sell their inventory to advertisers either directly or
through advertising marketplaces, and where large companies like Google have recently been
subject of antitrust lawsuits.1
Concurrently, competition authorities at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) have urged legislators against prohibitions of direct-to-consumer
sales by manufacturers. For example, regarding the prohibitions in the U.S. on direct sales
to consumers by auto manufacturers—and Tesla Motors in particular—, the FTC’s Office
of Policy Planning argued: “FTC staff offer no opinion on whether automobile distribution
through independent dealerships is superior or inferior to direct distribution by manufacturers.
[...] [C]onsumers are the ones best situated to choose for themselves both the cars they want to
buy and how they want to buy them.” (Federal Trade Commission, Press Release 2014). On
the same subject the following quotation from the DOJ website reads: “Just as Dell has altered
its distribution model in the personal computer industry to better meet evolving consumer
preferences, car customers would benefit from elimination of state bans on auto manufacturers’
1See, e.g., United States of America et al. v. Google LLC (2020) and Texas et al. v. Google LLC (2020).
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making direct sales to consumers.” (Bodisch 2009, p. 11).2 The fundamental principle that
consumers should be allowed to choose between manufacturers and retailers has been used
beyond Tesla’s case.3
Allowing direct-to-consumer sales by manufacturers (direct sales, henceforth) juxtaposes
potential gains to consumers related to additional competition/variety downstream and po-
tential increases in the costs of retailers arising from the additional bargaining leverage of
manufacturers.4 These two channels affect prices paid by consumers in opposite directions.
First, direct sales by the manufacturer increase competition in the market for final products,
thereby exerting downward pressure on the prices paid by consumers. Direct sales also gener-
ate additional product variety for consumers.5 When products are differentiated, additional
variety potentially increases consumer welfare through better segmentation as has been docu-
mented in the related literature described below. Second, direct sales increase the bargaining
leverage of manufacturers when negotiating with retailers. This effect increases retailers’ costs
by increasing negotiated wholesale prices and exerts upward pressure on the prices paid by
consumers. The net effect on the prices paid by consumers is ambiguous as we show in section
2. To quantify the magnitude of these effects, estimating a structural model is essential.
We develop a structural equilibrium model of a vertical industry, where manufacturers have
a dual channel to the consumer. The supply side features bargaining between manufacturers
and retailers, and direct sales. Manufacturers and retailers bargain over wholesale prices
through Nash bargaining. We incorporate direct sales to the workhorse bargaining model
used for applied work (e.g., Collard-Wexler et al. 2019). The outside option of a manufacturer
improves with direct sales: if negotiations fail a manufacturer is better off with direct sales
than without them. This feature is the main difference between our model and others in
the applied literature on bargaining.6 Final prices to consumers are determined through
Bertrand competition. The demand side is a standard discrete choice model of differentiated
products. Consumers have idiosyncratic preferences for prices; that is, we allow for unobserved
heterogeneity in the form of random coefficients for the price paid by consumers.
To illustrate our approach to investigating the welfare effects of direct sales, we estimate our
model using a unique dataset from the Portuguese outdoor advertising industry. We exploit
three features of the industry/data for the estimation. First, direct sales have been a steady
2Lafontaine and Scott Morton (2010) discuss state franchise laws in the context of automobile distribu-
tion and their implications for the profits of car manufacturers and dealers. They conclude that (p. 248):
“consumers would benefit if manufacturers could have much more leeway in experimenting with alternative
distribution models than the web of franchise laws currently in place allow them to do.” A direct-sales channel
is one of such alternative distribution models.
3See, e.g., Bodisch (2009), Lafontaine and Scott Morton (2010), and Lao et al. (2015).
4In the context of direct sales of this paper, the bargaining leverage of a manufacturer is defined as the
increase in the bargaining power of the manufacturer negotiating with a retailer due to the presence of direct
sales. See subsection 4.1 for details.
5We define variety as the number of products available to consumers in the market. See subsection 3.1 for
details.
6E.g., see Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Grennan (2013), Crawford et al. (2018), and the references
therein.
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feature of this industry over the last decade. Second, we collected market level data directly
from all the meaningful manufactures and retailers in the industry. The data encompass more
than 95 percent of the volume of transactions in the industry. Finally, we observe both final
prices paid by consumers and wholesale prices negotiated between manufacturers and retailers.
We separately estimate the demand- and supply-side parameters by GMM. The demand
estimation is standard and relies on a set of moment conditions and an adequate set of in-
struments. We estimate the supply-side parameters conditional on the demand estimates. For
the supply estimation we follow the literature on vertical relationships described below and
use the optimality of the pricing decisions upstream and downstream. Specifically, the first-
order conditions from the bargaining game between manufacturers and retailers determine the
bargaining parameters and marginal costs, conditional on prices and demand estimates. The
first-order conditions from the Bertrand-competition game for the final products determine
the marginal costs, conditional on prices and demand estimates. Identification of supply re-
lies on a set of instruments and the restrictions that marginal costs for a given manufacturer
do not vary across retailers and bargaining weights for a given retailer do not vary across
manufacturers, as discussed in section 3.
We use the estimated model to simulate counterfactual scenarios assessing the role of
direct sales on prices and welfare in the industry. We consider a counterfactual scenario
where direct sales are present but manufacturers cannot use them to increase their bargaining
leverage. We also consider a counterfactual scenario where direct sales are prohibited. We
show how the simulated counterfactual scenarios can be used to isolate the bargaining leverage
of manufacturers due to direct sales and to quantify the welfare effects of direct sales.
Our empirical analysis quantifies the two main effects discussed: the extent to which direct
sales increase wholesale prices due to the additional leverage of manufacturers, and its welfare
effects. First, direct sales increase manufacturers’ bargaining leverage allowing them to charge
wholesale prices that are 4 percent higher in our application. The additional bargaining
leverage decreases the profits of the retailers substantially, by 20 percent. Consumer welfare
is reduced due to the resulting increase in consumer retail prices. Second, prohibiting direct
sales generates a large decrease in both consumer welfare and manufacturers’ profits in our
application, 59 percent and 43 percent, respectively. Retail prices increase substantially by 26
percent as a consequence of the prohibition. There is yet an increase in retail market shares
reflecting that consumers divert from direct to retail products. Retailers are the conspicuous
winners from the direct-sales prohibition. Their profits increase substantially. We conclude
by discussing the relevance of the bargaining leverage effect for vertical merger evaluation.
In summary, this paper makes two main contributions. First, it develops a supply model
featuring bargaining and direct sales to show that direct sales increase the bargaining power
of manufacturers and have ambiguous effects on final prices paid by consumers and welfare.
Second, we apply our model to the outdoor advertising industry to illustrate how the estimated
model can be used to quantify these effects and discuss the implications for merger evaluation.
3
Related Literature
Since the work by McGuire and Staelin (1983), Lee and Staelin (1997), and Choi (1991), the
theoretical implici.e., ations of direct-to-consumer sales by manufacturers have been studied
extensively in the marketing literature.7 In an influential paper, McGuire and Staelin (1983)
develop a model of retail choice in a duopoly setting where each manufacturer distributes
its products through a single exclusive retailer. They find that vertical integration is more
profitable than non-integration when consumers’ preferences for the manufacturer’s products
are sufficiently differentiated. Chiang, Chhajed, and Hess (2003) study the strategic effects
arising when a manufacturer decides to use direct marketing (i.e., a direct channel to the
consumers). They study a Stackelberg game, where a manufacturer distributes its product
through a retailer and considers opening a direct channel. The direct channel makes the
manufacturer more profitable even if no sales occur by reducing inefficiencies due to double
marginalization, similar to our case. Different to our case where wholesale prices are negoti-
ated, opening a direct channel in their game results in a reduction in wholesale prices which
may also benefit the retailers. Also in a setting where wholesale prices are not negotiated,
Arya, Mittendorf, and Sappington (2007) show that retailers may benefit from direct sales
from an encroaching supplier when the latter does not facilitate product differentiation. Cai
(2010) also uses a Stackelberg game to study the impact of channel selection on the supply
chain with dual-channels (i.e., with direct sales) with and without coordination; the paper
shows that the profitability of different supply chain structures depends on consumers’ prefer-
ences/substitutability for the distribution channels and their operational costs, similar to our
paper.
Our paper is also related to the raising rivals’ costs (RRC) theory by Salop and Scheffman
(1983).8 The RRC theory proposes a model to explain why vertical integration raises input
prices to downstream rivals and may foreclose product-market competition, thus decreasing
consumer welfare.9 The original RRC theory assumes that manufacturers upstream have all
the bargaining power.10 Recent studies by Rogerson (2020, 2021) incorporate bargaining be-
tween upstream and downstream firms to investigate the competitive effect of vertical mergers.
Closest to our paper, Rogerson (2020) shows that a vertical merger allows the merged firm to
increase the price that it charges rival downstream firms for inputs by increasing its bargaining
leverage over these downstream rivals. He calls it the bargaining leverage over rivals (BLR)
7There is also a large literature on the theoretical effects of supply chain competition. See Cachon (2002)
and Ingene and Parry (2004) for surveys of the models used by the literature. See Tsay, Nahmias, and Agrawal
(1999) for a review of the literature on supply chain contracts. See Cattani, Gilland, and Swaminathan (2004)
for a survey of models used in internet supply chains.
8See also Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) and Salop and Scheffman (1987).
9See Riordan (2008) for a survey about the economics literature on the competitive effects of vertical
integration. See also the discussions by Salop and Culley (2016) and Salop (2018). Below we discuss the
empirical studies investigating vertical integration.
10In early studies, the submissions by Rogerson (2003a,b) to the Federal Communications Commission for
the merger evaluation by News Corp./DirecTV introduce bargaining theory to the analysis of the vertical
merger. See Rogerson (2021) for a recent discussion about the generalized RRC theory for vertical merger
evaluation.
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effect. The BLR effect has a similar economic interpretation to the bargaining leverage effect
analyzed in our paper. There are two main differences between the paper by Rogerson and
ours. First, the main focus of Rogerson (2020) is the evaluation of vertical mergers. Our
main focus in this paper is the evaluation of direct sales. A vertical merger and the creation
of a direct-to-consumer channel give rise to similar economic principles. They are, however,
different strategies. The magnitude of the bargaining leverage and double marginalization
effects may differ across these two strategies, as discussed in subsection 4.3. Furthermore, the
creation of a direct-to-consumer channel involves an additional effect: the creation of a new
downstream brand, thus increasing competition and product variety downstream and benefit-
ing consumers. Second, the models developed are different. Rogerson (2020) develops a theory
that can be used to derive an intuitive formula to measure the upward pricing pressure caused
by a vertical merger due to changes in bargaining leverage. We develop a structural model
injecting bargaining theory into the evaluation of direct sales that can be used to quantify
the bargaining leverage and welfare effects of direct sales. Rogerson (2021) investigates the
extent to which vertical integration raises input prices to downstream rivals when input prices
are determined by Nash bargaining, both for the case where upstream and downstream prices
are set sequentially and for the case where they are set simultaneously. To summarize, our
contributions to the strands of literatures mentioned in this and the previous paragraphs are
twofold. First, to provide an empirical framework to study direct sales when manufacturers
and retailers bargain over wholesale prices. Second, to quantify the impact of direct sales on
(wholesale and final) prices and welfare to consumers in a real-world setting.
There has also been a number of empirical studies investigating direct and online sales
(e.g., Anderson and Coughlan 1987; Pozzi 2013; Duch-Brown, Grzybowski, Romahn, and
Verboven 2017; Quan and Williams 2018; Cazaubiel, Cure, Johansen, and Vergé 2018), channel
interactions (e.g., Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim 2000; Sudhir 2001; Cotterill and
Putsis 2001; Villas-Boas and Zhao 2005), bargaining (e.g., Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-
Boas 2010; Crawford and Yurukoglu 2012; Grennan 2013), intermediaries (e.g., Quan and
Williams 2018; Donna, Pereira, Pires, and Trindade 2019), and vertical relations and vertical
integration (e.g., Brenkers and Verboven 2006; Villas-Boas 2007; Crawford, Lee, Whinston,
and Yurukoglu 2018; Cuesta, Noton, and Vatter 2019; Luco and Marshall 2020a). We discuss
the relation to each of these branches in turn.
As regards online sales, Anderson and Coughlan (1987) empirically investigate the choice
of the distribution channel in foreign markets by U.S. semiconductor firms using a logistic
regression analysis. They show that a product is more likely to be sold through the channel
in place and that U.S. firms are more likely to integrate the distribution channel in Western
Europe. They are interested in the factors leading to the distribution choice; instead, we are
interested in the effect of the direct channel on market outcomes. Duch-Brown, Grzybowski,
Romahn, and Verboven (2017) investigate the impact of e-commerce in the consumer elec-
tronics industry in Europe. They find that an online distribution channel increases total sales
but also diverts sales from the traditional channel. They conclude that consumers and firms
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benefit but the increase in consumer surplus is larger due to the positive valuation from the
additional channel. Pozzi (2013) studies the introduction of online shopping by a supermar-
ket chain. He finds an increase in overall revenues and limited cannibalization of sales from
brick-and-mortar stores. Quan and Williams (2018) investigate the impact of online retail.
They focus on the gains from increased product variety. In our model, direct sales increase
product variety, thus improving consumer welfare through better segmentation similar to, e.g.,
Trindade (2015). Cazaubiel, Cure, Johansen, and Vergé (2018) investigate the degree of sub-
stitution between booking a hotel room directly and using online platforms. They find that
consumers are more likely to substitute to other hotels in that platform rather than staying
loyal to the chain. They also find that most of the consumers who switch channels prefer to
book directly with the hotel rather than through a competing platform. These papers study
how the introduction of online sales affects offline sales from the same firm. Our contribution
to this literature is to investigate the effect of direct sales on the sales of retailers. The direct
channel in our context affects how firms (manufacturers and retailers) interact. For example,
it can increase a manufacturer’s bargaining leverage when negotiating wholesale prices with
retailers.
The empirical literature on channel interactions uses methods from the game-theoretical
literature on channel interactions in marketing to build empirical models and to investigate
issues related to market power in different industries. They typically focus the analysis on
pricing power in channels and within a product category. Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vil-
cassim (2000) estimate a structural model of channel interactions to measure the degree of
market power of manufacturers and a retailer in the refrigerated juice market. Sudhir (2001)
structurally estimate alternative models of vertical interactions between manufacturers and a
retailer for the yogurt and peanut butter markets. Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) estimate a
structural model for the ketchup market to investigate the role manufacturers’ competition
and the impact of category pricing of the multiproduct retailer. The structural approach and
the interest of this literature on the channel interactions are similar to our paper. However,
these papers do not feature bargaining on the supply side.
Closest to our paper, Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010) develop a bargaining
model to investigate the determinants of bargaining in the channel. Their model contains
bargaining, multiple retailers, multiple manufacturers, and heterogeneous consumers, similar
to ours. Our bargaining model is also similar to, e.g., Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) and
Grennan (2013), and the empirical literature that followed. Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012)
investigate the welfare effect of bundling in multichannel television markets; they develop a
channel-distributor bargaining on the supply side. Grennan (2013) studies the welfare effects
of price discrimination in a medical device market; he develops a model that allows for bar-
gaining and price discrimination in this industry. In our model manufacturers also sell directly
to consumers, which is not modeled by any of these papers. Similar to our paper, manufactur-
ers also sell directly to the consumers in Donna, Pereira, Pires, and Trindade (2019) (DPPT
henceforth). This is, to the best of our knowledge, the only empirical paper where manufac-
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turers sell directly to consumers and manufacturers bargain with retailers. The main focus
of DPPT is, however, the demand side. DPPT investigate the welfare effects to consumers
of the services provided by the intermediaries. They use their supply model only to compute
counterfactual prices. DPPT do not account for the central feature in our model, which is
that a direct-to-consumer channel enhances manufacturer bargaining power, which can harm
retail consumers. In contrast, our main focus here is the supply side. We do this to investigate
the impact of direct sales on manufacturers’ bargaining power which is not studied by DPPT.
Ellickson, Kong, and Lovett (2018) study how private labels improve the retailer’s bargaining
position. They find that direct sales by the retailer generate a bargaining benefit through more
favorable margins on the competing branded products, analogue to the increase in bargaining
power to manufacturers in our case. While they study the effect of direct sales by a retailer
(private labels), we study the effect of direct sales by a manufacturer. In addition, the supply
side models are different. While they assume that retailers are monopolists (supermarkets),
we allow for Bertrand competition among multiple retailers in the final product market. They
use the monopoly assumption to infer wholesale prices which are unobserved in their data. In
contrast, we do observe wholesale prices in our data. We use the observed wholesale prices
and the restrictions from the Bertrand equilibrium to estimate retailers’ marginal costs. For
these reasons, the supply side identifying assumptions are different.
Our paper is also related to the literature that studies the vertical relationships between
manufacturers and retailers, and vertical integration. In our paper, the two layers of activity
are related vertically as in, e.g., Brenkers and Verboven (2006), Mortimer (2008), Bonnet and
Dubois (2010), Villas-Boas (2007), Dubois and Sæthre (2016). The main difference between
these papers and ours is that in our model manufacturers and retailers bargain over whole-
sale prices. Bargaining models similar to the one in our paper have been recently used in
a number of empirical papers investigating vertical integration. Crawford, Lee, Whinston,
and Yurukoglu (2018) study vertical integration in multichannel television markets. In their
paper vertical integration creates potential losses arising from incentives to foreclose rivals
and raise their costs. In our case, direct sales create potential increases in the costs of retail-
ers arising from the additional bargaining power of manufacturers. Thus the counterfactual
benchmarks are different. That is, while they study how a vertically integrated manufacturer
affects wholesale/final prices and welfare (relative to a situation where the manufacturer sells
through a downstream distributor), we study how the presence of a direct sales channel affects
those outcomes (relative to a situation without direct channel).11 Vertical integration gener-
ates efficiency gains due to the elimination of the double marginalization and the mentioned
foreclosure effects; direct sales generates additional competition/variety downstream and the
mentioned increased in the costs of retailers. Cuesta, Noton, and Vatter (2019) study vertical
integration between insurers and hospitals using administrative data from Chile and find that
vertical integration decreases welfare. Luco and Marshall (2020a) investigate the incentives of
11E.g., see example 7 and the discussion in section 2.
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a multiproduct firm to divert demand towards the products with eliminated double margins in
vertically integrated markets. Luco and Marshall (2020b) present a model of a vertical supply
chain to analyze equilibrium effects of vertical integration and show that the elimination of
double marginalization may fail to be procompetitive in multiproduct industries.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature studying outdoor advertising. This literature
is quite small due to data limitations. We are only aware of two papers. Pereira and Ribeiro
(2018) study capacity divestitures and DPPT study intermediation in this industry. These
papers do not study how direct sales affect bargaining.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
discusses the data, identification, and estimation. Section 4 quantifies the effects from direct
sales on outcomes. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this section we present the model, discuss the economic forces at play, and show the effects
of direct sales on wholesale and final prices to consumers.
2.1 Demand Model
We use a standard random coefficients logit model for individual demand similar to Berry
(1994), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and Nevo (2001). Assume there are t = 1, . . . , T
markets, each with a continuum of rational, utility-maximizing consumers indexed by i. In
each market t there are Jt horizontally differentiated inside products indexed by j = 1, 2, ..., Jt.
We index by j = 0 the outside product. The indirect utility of consumer i from buying product
j in market t is:
uijt = −αipjt + xjtβ + τf + τm + τr + τt + ξjt + ǫijt,
where pjt denotes the price of product j in market t; xjt is a S-dimensional (row) vector of
observable characteristics of product j in market t; τf , τm, τr, and τt capture the preferences
for type of good f ,12 manufacturer m, retailer r, and monthly seasonal effects in market t,
using fixed dummy variables for type of good, manufacturer, retailer, and monthly seasonal
effects, respectively; ξjt is the valuation of unobserved (by the econometrician) characteristics
of product j in market t; ǫijt are stochastic terms assumed to be distributed according to a Type
I extreme-value distribution; αi are individual-specific parameters that capture consumers’
preferences for price as described below; and β is a S-dimensional vector of parameters. In
each market t we normalize the characteristics of the outside product, j = 0, such that
ui0t = ǫi0t for all t.
We model the distribution of consumers’ preferences for price as αi = α+σνi, where α and
σ are parameters, νi captures unobserved (by the econometrician) individual characteristics,
and Pν(νi) is a parametric distribution assumed to be a standardized Normal, N (0, 1), for the
12Display format in the application studied in section 3.
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estimation. Denote by δjt ≡ −αpjt+xjtβ+ τf + τm+ τr + τt+ ξjt the mean utility for product
j in market t (i.e., the portion of the utility that is constant across types of consumers). Then
uijt = δjt − σvipjt + ǫijt. The probability that consumer i purchases product j in market t,





k=1 exp(δkt − σvipkt)
,
where the equality follows from the well known logit choice probability.
Let Ajt(·) be the set of individuals who choose product j in market t. Then Ajt(x.t, p.t, δ.t, σ) =
{(vi, ǫi0t, ..., ǫiJt)|uijt ≥ uilt, ∀l = 0, 1, ..., J}, where x.t = (x1t, ..., xJt)
′, p.t = (p1t, ..., pJt)
′, and
δ.t = (δ1t, ..., δJt)
′ are observed characteristics, prices, and mean utilities for all products,
respectively. Then, the market share function for each product j is:




Given our focus on the supply side in this paper we purposely posit a simple specification
of the demand system. This allows to keep the notation compact and highlight the main
economic forces at play on the supply side. As we explain below, the demand- and supply-
side parameters are estimated separately. It is thus straightforward to apply the supply-side
analysis to a different specification of the demand system. In particular, we can allow for
correlation in the unobserved shocks between channels by, e.g., assuming that the epsilons
are distributed according to the distribution assumptions of the nested logit. We can also
allow for consumers to engage in costly search. To keep the demand side simple, we present
the case where the epsilons are independently and identically distributed across channels and
consumers do not engage in search. See DPPT for a more general specification of the demand
side.13
2.2 Supply Model
There are two types of multi-product firms, manufacturers and retailers. Manufacturers pro-
duce basic production factors, called display formats, that they sell either to the retailers or
to the consumers directly. A production factor (display format) from a given manufacturer
sold to different retailers generates different products. Retailers combine manufacturer prod-
ucts with their own retail production factors to produce retail products, also called display
formats, that they sell to consumers. There are m = 1, . . . ,M manufacturers and r = 1, . . . , R
retailers. Let J be the set of differentiated products. Denote by ΩRm the set of products that
manufacturer m sells to retailers, ΩDm the set of products that manufacturer m sells directly to
the consumers, and Ωr the set of products that retailer r sells to the consumers. The timing
is as follows:
13The results discussed in section 3 are robust to demand specifications using unobserved preferences for
the distribution channels and costly search. Results are available upon request.
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(1a) Manufacturers and retailers bargain over wholesale prices, w ≡ {wj}j∈J , where wj
represents the wholesale price paid by a retailer to the manufacturer of product j.
(1b) Simultaneously with the bargaining over wholesale prices, retailers and manufacturers
set retail prices, p ≡ {pj}j∈J to the consumers through a Nash Bertrand game. The
vector p includes products from retailers and direct sales.
(2) Consumers observe all prices, p, and choose the product that maximizes their utility,
thus determining the market shares, {sj(p)}j∈J . Profits are realized.
Firms maximize profits when bargaining over wholesale prices and setting retail prices.







where M denotes market size; pRj denotes the price of product j sold to consumers by the
retailer; and sRj (p) denotes the market share of product j sold to consumers by the retailer.
















where cmj denotes the manufacturer’s marginal cost of product j; p
D
j denotes the price of
product j sold to consumers directly by the manufacturer; and sDj (p) denotes the market
share of product j sold to consumers by the manufacturer directly.
Three comments are in order. First, we have explicitly distinguished with superscripts
the market share of product j sold to retailers, denoted by sRj (p), and the market share of
product j sold directly to consumers, denoted by sDj (p). Similarly for the prices of products
sold to consumers by retailers, pRj , and by manufacturers directly, p
D
j . This notation eases the
discussion of the examples in subsection 2.3. Second, we assume retailers’ only marginal cost
is the wholesale price. We make this assumption because the observed retail margins in our
data are positive but very small. Thus retailers’ marginal costs would have to be very small.15
Finally, note that the profit function of manufacturers contains two terms: the profits from
selling the products to the retailers and directly to the consumers. In the subsequent analysis
of this section, we take the demand system as a primitive and analyze each of the following
in turn: equilibrium determination of retail prices, bargaining over wholesale prices, and the
leverage effect obtained by a manufacturer with direct sales.
Retail price setting. Retail prices are given by the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. The nec-
essary first-order conditions for the retailers are:
14We omit the market subscript, t, for the variables in this subsection to simplify the notation.








= 0, ∀j ∈ Ωr, r = 1, . . . , R. (4)

















= 0, ∀j ∈ Ωfm, f ∈ {R,D}, m = 1, . . . ,M.
(5)
The system of equations in (4) and (5) defines the vector of prices to consumers set by the
retailers and by the manufacturers directly, pR and pD.
Wholesale price setting. The equilibrium concept for the determination of negotiated
wholesale prices is Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains (Nash-in-Nash, henceforth), first pro-
posed by Horn and Wolinsky (1988). Each negotiated wholesale price is the solution of a
Nash bargain. All negotiated wholesale prices form a Nash equilibrium, i.e., no manufacturer-
retailer pair would like to change their negotiated wholesale price given all other agreements.
We assume that firms have “passive beliefs,” in that while bargaining they do not expect the
other contracts to be renegotiated in case negotiation fails. This assumption is standard and
has been used in applied work by Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010) and Crawford,
Lee, Whinston, and Yurukoglu (2018), among others.
In the Nash-in-Nash framework, the disagreement payoff of a firm in the negotiation of the
wholesale price of a given product is defined as the profit this firm would earn if that product
was not offered keeping the other wholesale prices fixed. The disagreement payoffs for each























where the terms sRk,−j(p−j) and s
D
k,−j(p−j) represent the market shares of product k if product
j is not offered.
























, ∀j ∈ Ωr, r = 1, . . . , R.
where λj ∈ (0, 1) for all j is the retailer’s bargaining weight vis-à-vis manufacturers; and
the terms GFT jr and GFT
j
m stand for gains-from-trade from product j for retailer r and
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manufacturer m, respectively.






, ∀j ∈ Ωr, r = 1, . . . , R. (6)
In words, equation (6) says that the ratio of gains over the corresponding disagreement
profits is equal to the ratio of bargaining weights. Rewrite equation (6) as:16
wjs
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, ∀j ∈ Ωr, r = 1, . . . , R. (7)




k(p), with f ∈ {R,D}.











j are non-negative terms representing the additional profits
the firm obtains from its other products (from the retail and direct channel, respectively) when
product j stops being offered. The term dRj + d
D
j represents manufacturer m’s opportunity
cost or shadow price from dealing with retailer r. The presence of direct sales increases this
opportunity cost.
The system of equations in (7) defines wholesale prices as a function of demand primitives
and the vector of prices to consumers set by the retailers and by the manufacturers directly,
pR and pD. Finally, note that for manufacturers that do not sell directly to consumers the
problem and optimality conditions are analogous with the only difference being that dDj is
zero.
Equilibrium. Using the notation for the firms in this subsection rewrite the market share




Pij dPν(νi), ∀j ∈ J . (8)
The market share function in (8), and the equilibrium prices of the industry in (4), (5), and
(7) characterize the equilibrium behavior in the industry.
2.3 Economic Intuition
In this subsection we present three examples to discuss the main economic forces at play
and how the existence of a direct channel may affect the negotiated wholesale prices and
the prices paid by consumers. In the first example there is a single manufacturer interacting
with a single retailer. It shows that the negotiated wholesale price and the final price to
16See appendix A for details about the derivations of equations (6) and (7).
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consumers decrease unambiguously when the manufacturer does not leverage its direct sales
in the negotiation. In the second example there are two manufacturers interacting with a
single retailer. It shows the same results from example 1 when both manufacturers do not
use leverage of direct sales. In the third example we show that there are ambiguous effects
on prices upstream and downstream when only one manufacturer does not leverage its direct
sales in the negotiation. Throughout the rest of this subsection we assume that downstream
products are substitutes.17
Example 1. No leverage with one manufacturer and one retailer.


































(b) M1 does not use leverage from direct sales.
Notes: The figure illustrates the leverage effect with one manufacturer and one retailer from example 1.
Panel a. In the upstream manufacturer M1 produces input 1 at marginal cost c1. This input is sold to retailer R1 at the
negotiated wholesale price w1, and used to manufacture product jD1 . In the downstream there are two competing firms, M1 and
R1. Manufacturer M1 sells product jD1 directly to consumers at price p
D
1




The dotted red line denotes that the manufacturer M1 does not use the leverage from direct sales when negotiating with retailer
R1. Not using the leverage results in a lower (relative to panel a) negotiated wholesale price, w′1 < w1. Holding constant
product competition and product variety downstream, the decrease in the wholesale price to w′
1








There is one manufacturer, M1 and one retailer, R1. In the upstream manufacturer
M1 produces input 1 at marginal cost c1. This input is sold to retailer R1 at the ne-
gotiated wholesale price w1, and used to manufacture product j
D
1 . In the downstream
there are two competing firms, M1 and R1. Manufacturer M1 sells product j
D
1 directly to
consumers at price pD1 . Retailer R1 sells product j
R
1 at price p
R
1 . There are three prices,
w1, p
D
1 , and p
R
1 , characterized by the system in equations (4), (5), and (6). Figure 1a
depicts the situation. The downstream first-order conditions (4) and (5) become:
(pR1 ) : s
R






17The discussion about the opening of a direct-to-consumer channel also involves the elimination of double
marginalization. We omit the double-marginalization effect in this subsection because it is not relevant for the
trade-off emphasized in these examples. See subsection 4.3 for a discussion about the elimination of double
marginalization in the context of direct sales.
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(pD1 ) : s
D
1 + (w1 − c1)
∂sR1
∂pD1




Similarly, the upstream first-order condition (6) can be written as:
(w1) :
[

















where the term on the right-hand side represents the direct sales effect denoted by DSE.
Now consider the same setting without leverage of the manufacturer from direct sales.
Figure 1b depicts the situation. The dotted red line denotes that the manufacturer M1
does not use the leverage from direct sales when negotiating with retailer R1. To keep
product variety and downstream competition constant we maintain that direct sales are
still an option for consumers. This allows us to isolate the leverage effect due to direct
sales.18 Without leverage of the manufacturer the term DSE in the last equation is zero.
Then:
w1 = λc1 + (1− λ)p
R
1 + DSE/sR1 (p)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
with direct sales





where the inequality follows because a change in ∆w1 > 0 in w1 generates a change in
the same direction but lower in magnitude in pR1 , because the pass-through from w1 to
pR1 cannot exceed one and because 0 < λ < 1.
19
Thus, w1 > w
′
1. The decrease in wholesale prices without leverage creates a downward





In sum, when the manufacturer starts using the leverage from direct sales: (i) whole-
sale prices increase upstream allowing it to extract a higher fraction of the vertical
channel surplus; and (ii) prices to consumers increase downstream.
Example 2. No leverage effect from two manufacturers.
Now there are two manufactures and one retailer. In the upstream manufacturers
M1 and M2 produce, respectively, inputs 1 and 2 at costs c1 and c2. These inputs are
sold to retailer R1 at, respectively, the negotiated wholesale prices w1 and w2, and used
to manufacture products jD1 and j
D
2 . In the downstream there are three competing





directly to consumers at prices pD1 and p
D













1 , and p
R
2 . Figure 3a
depicts the situation. The downstream first-order conditions in equations (4) and (5)
become:
(pR1 ) : s
R





(p) + (pR2 − w2)
∂sR2
∂pR1
(p) = 0, (9)
18Alternatively, one can think about a manufacturer with two separate divisions/managers, one for direct
sales to consumers and other for wholesales to retailers. These managers/divisions do not internalize the profits
from the other division.
19That is, let ∆w1 ≡ |w
′






1 |, where the prime superscripts refer to the situation



































































(b) Neither M1 nor M2 use leverage
from direct sales.
Notes: The figure illustrates the leverage effect of one manufacturer with two manufacturers and one retailer from example 2.
Panel a. In the upstream manufacturers M1 and M2 produce, respectively, inputs 1 and 2 at costs c1 and c2. These inputs are




In the downstream there are three competing firms, M1, M2, and R1. Manufacturers M1 and M2 sell, respectively, products jD1
and jD
2












Panel b. The dotted red lines denote that the manufacturers M1 and M2 do not use the leverage from direct sales when negotiating




Holding constant product competition and product variety downstream, the decrease in the wholesale prices create an imbalance




will determine how retailer R1 will adjust its prices.
For example, if w′
2
decreases more than w′
1







to divert demand to product jR
2
.
(pR2 ) : s
R





(p) + (pR1 − w1)
∂sR1
∂pR2
(p) = 0, (10)
(pD1 ) : (w1 − c1)
∂sR1
∂pD1





(p) = 0, (11)
(pD2 ) : (w2 − c2)
∂sR2
∂pD2





(p) = 0. (12)

































The main difference relative to example 1 is on the right-hand side: in the downstream
firms now have to take into account the profits from product 2. The above condition
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can be rewritten as:
(w1) :
[





























Similarly, for manufacturer M2:
(w2) :
[





























Now consider the situation in Figure 2b where neither M1 nor M2 use leverage from
direct sales. Using the last equations one can see that both wholesale prices decrease to
w′1 and w
′
2. This generates an imbalance in the first-order conditions (9) to (12). Prices
from the retailer downstream, pR1 and p
R
2 , may increase or decrease depending on the
relative change of wholesale prices and the demand system. To see this consider the first-
order conditions of the multi-product retailer, (9) and (10). For example, if w1 decreases
substantially more than w2, R1 may have an incentive to decrease p
R
1 and to increase
pR2 to divert demand towards the cheaper product upstream. Alternatively, (9) and (10)
may generate an incentive to decrease both prices, pR1 and p
R
2 . The manufacturers’ first-










In sum, when both manufacturers start using leverage from direct sales: (i) wholesale
prices increase upstream; and (ii) some prices to consumers increase, while others may
decline.
Example 3. Two manufacturers, no leverage from one of them.
Consider now the same situation as in example 2 where equilibrium prices are char-
acterized by first-order conditions (9) to (14). Now, however, consider a situation where
only M1 uses leverage from direct sales as depicted in figure 3b. As before when M2 does
not use the leverage of direct sales the negotiated wholesale price decreases, w′2 < w2
relative to Figure 3a. The effect upon w1 is less clear because the final prices to con-
sumers move in different directions. To see this, consider retailer first-order conditions.
The decrease in the wholesale price to w′2 creates an imbalance:


























Now it is relatively more profitable for retailer R1 to sell product j
R
2 . There is an
incentive to increase pR1 relative to p
R
2 to divert demand to product j
R
2 . This effect
16































































(b) M2 does not use leverage from di-
rect sales.
Notes: The figure illustrates the leverage effect of one manufacturer with two manufacturers and one retailer from example 3.
Panel a. In the upstream, manufacturers M1 and M2 produce, respectively, inputs 1 and 2 at costs c1 and c2. These inputs are




the downstream, there are three competing firms, M1, M2, and R1. Manufacturers M1 and M2 sell, respectively, products jD1
and jD
2












Panel b. The dotted red line denotes that the manufacturer M2 does not use the leverage from direct sales when negotiating with
retailer R1. Not using the leverage results in a lower (relative to panel a) negotiated wholesale price for M2, w′2 < w2. Holding
constant product competition and product variety downstream, the decrease in the wholesale price to w′
2
creates an imbalance
in the first-order conditions of the retailer. Now is relatively more profitable for retailer R1 to sell product jR2 , thus creating an






to divert demand to product jR
2
.
is documented by Luco and Marshall (2020a) for the carbonated beverage industry.20
Thus, in the upstream the net effect upon w1 is ambiguous. In the downstream prices
move in different directions: pD2 and p
R





In sum, example 3 shows that when one manufacturer starts using the leverage from
direct sales it is relatively more profitable for the retailer to sell the product of the
manufacturer without direct sales. This creates an incentive for the retailer to increase
the price of the product from the manufacturer with direct sales. In turn this creates an
ambiguous effect on final prices to consumers. There is also an ambiguous effect on the
negotiated price of the other manufacturer.
In appendix C we provide three examples with the graphic representation of the industry
for the following cases: (i) no direct sales from one manufacturer; (ii) no direct sales from
both manufacturers; and (iii) direct sales vs. vertical integration. In section 4 we investigate
counterfactual outcomes similar to the ones in the examples above, but using a more general
setting with multiple manufacturers, multiple retailers, and multiple display formats applied
to the outdoor advertising industry.
20They call it the Edgeworth-Salinger effect.
17
3 Data, Identification, and Estimation
3.1 Data
In this subsection we provide an overview of the industry and the data.21
Industry. For the empirical analysis we focus on the outdoor advertising industry in Por-
tugal. There are three main economic agents in this industry: manufacturers, retailers, and
consumers. A manufacturer is a firm that installs and commercially exploits equipment for the
display of outdoor advertising. A retailer is an intermediary that buys advertising from the
manufacturer on behalf of the consumer. Finally, a consumer is a firm that demands advertis-
ing to promote its products. For inside products, consumers make 85 percent of their purchases
from the retailers and the remaining 15 percent directly from the manufacturers (table 1). In
this industry there are two active distribution channels: direct sales and retailing.
There are three main display formats: 2 m2 panels,22 Seniors, and Others. Panels of 2 m2
are relatively small panels that appear on city information panels, bus shelters, kiosks, etc. A
Senior is an advertising panel with an area between 8 and 24 m2. The last category, “Oth-
ers,” encompasses Transports and Special Formats. A Transport includes panels on moving
vehicles (e.g., buses, trains, taxis, etc.) or transport hubs (e.g., airports, railway’s stations,
subways’ stations, etc.). A Special Format is large panel typically made by special request to
be displayed, e.g., on buildings’ gables.
Dataset, products, and market. The dataset was obtained from DPPT. It is administra-
tive data with all the meaningful manufacturers and retailers in the industry for the year 2013
aggregated at the monthly market level. The data encompass more than 95 percent of the
volume of transactions in the industry. Following DPPT, we consider 3 display formats: 2 m2
panel, senior, and an additional category aggregating the remaining formats that have very
small market shares individually. We consider 4 manufacturers: the 3 main manufacturers in
the industry (J.C. Decaux Group, Cemusa, and Mop) and an additional manufacturer that
aggregates the smaller manufacturers. Finally, we consider 9 retailers: the 5 main retailers
in the industry (Omnicom Media Group, WPP Plc., Power Media Group Inc., Havas Media
Group, and Interpublic Group of Companies), 1 additional retailer that aggregates the smaller
retailers, and the 3 manufacturers selling directly to consumers (J.C. Decaux Group, Cemusa,
and Mop). The smaller manufacturers do not sell directly to consumers. We refer to the 3
main manufacturers as m1, m2, and m3, not necessarily in the order above, to the additional







same order as the 3 main manufacturers, to the 5 main retailers as rv4 , . . . , r
v
8 , not necessarily
in the order above, and to the additional retailer as rv9 . Characteristics of the manufacturers
21DPPT, Section 2 provide a thorough description.
22In the setting studied m2 refers to square meters.
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and retailers were collected by inspecting the websites of the retailers and manufacturers. The
appendix in DPPT describes the procedure to clean the data.
In each month and for each triplet of display format, manufacturer, and retailer we ob-
serve: the total sales, measured in Euros; the total quantity of advertising sold, measured in
advertising faces and square meters; the wholesale prices charged from the manufacturers to
the retailers, measured in Euros; the commissions, fees, and quantity discounts paid to the
manufacturers, measured in Euros; and the installed capacity, measured in advertising faces.
We also observe characteristics for each manufacturer and retailer, such as the number of
offices.
We define a product as a combination of display format, manufacturer, and retailer (in-
cluding direct sales and retailers). Geographically, all manufacturers and retailers operate in
the same market. This follows from Portugal being a small country, where the population is
concentrated along the coast. For the definition of the geographic market we follow the Por-
tuguese Competition Authority which considered that the geographic market for this industry
is Portugal.23
Following DPPT, we use the data described above to build a data set of products sold for
each month of the year 2013 and their characteristics. Market shares are defined by dividing
volume sales by the total potential sales in a given month (i.e., market size). This potential
sales (or market size) was assumed to be twenty percent greater than the maximum observed
total monthly sales of the year 2013. The market share of the outside good was defined
as the difference between one, and the sum of the market shares of the inside goods in each
month. The outside good can be conceptualized as including products outside the sample (e.g.,
special request panels), outdoor advertising sold by other manufacturers and retailers (e.g.,
small manufacturers and retailers that operate locally), and not buying outdoor advertising.
An observation in this data set represents a market share of a product as defined above in a
given month. We consider 12 markets, one for each month of the year, and a continuum of
heterogeneous consumers in each market.
Summary statistics. We provide summary statistics of the market shares and prices in
tables 1 and 2, respectively. Table 1 shows the market shares of each of the products in the
sample. All of the retailers contract with the three largest manufacturers. Table 2 reports
summary statistics on wholesale and retail prices for each display format. Mean retail prices
are only slightly higher than the corresponding wholesale prices. That is, retailers have a
low margins indicating they have low bargaining power. Table 2 shows large differences in
prices across both manufacturers and retailers holding constant the display format. These
price differences and the differences in the observed market shares suggest that differentiation
is important in this industry.
23See the merger review case on the outdoor advertising industry, case Ccent. 15/2014 JCDecaux/Cemusa.
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3.2 Identification and Estimation
Below, we discuss identification and estimation of the demand- and supply-side parameters
using aggregate-level data. We devote more space to supply side, which is the focus of the
paper.
Demand
Identification of demand. Identification of the price coefficient, α, and the heterogeneity
parameter, σ, requires at least one instrument for each of these parameters. We rely on
instruments with exclusion restrictions. As regards the price coefficient, we assume that firms
observe ξjt in the supply model. It enters thus in the markup term of the pricing equation
and introduces a bias to the estimate of α. We use prices of the same product in other
markets as instruments for the price of the product in the current market, as in Hausman
(1996) and Nevo (2001). As regards the heterogeneity parameter, there is an endogeneity
problem due to the parameter σ interacting with the endogenous variables, (sjp, pjt). We use
a variation of the differentiation instruments proposed by Gandhi and Houde (2019). We
construct instruments defined by a proximity measure counting the number of competitors
located within one standard deviation of product j. Specifically, we use the count of other
products whose predicted prices lie within five Euros of the own price, and the interaction of
this variable with product and manufacturer dummy variables.24,25
Estimation of demand. We estimate the parameters that characterize demand without
using the supply-side model. We estimate the model by GMM by relying on the moment
condition E[Z ′ω(θ∗)] = 0, where Z is the matrix of instruments obtained by stacking the
instruments described in the previous paragraph, ω(·) is a vector with the structural error








where A is a consistent estimate of E(Z ′ωω′Z); for the estimation we use the inverse of the
sample variance of the empirical moments as the weighting matrix.
For each candidate parameter vector, we use equation (1) to compute the market share
function, sjt(pjt, xjt, δjt; σ). Then, we find the mean utility level, δjt, that equates:
sjt(pjt, xjt, δjt; σ) = Sjt, (15)
24Following DPPT we use predicted prices instead of the potentially endogenous prices. To that end, to
construct the differentiation instruments, we run a preliminary regression of prices on characteristics, predict
prices from this regression, and use the predicted prices to count the number of products within the 5-
Euro band. Using such predicted prices generates a valid instrument (even if prices are endogenous) because
the characteristics used in the preliminary regression are exogenous. Such regression generates an unbiased
estimate of prices in which structural shocks are removed. The characteristics included in the preliminary
regression explain over 90 percent of the price variation in the data.
25We have also experimented with a band of ten Euros and obtained similar results.
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where Sjt are the observed market shares obtained from the data. We use the contraction
mapping by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) to solve for the system of equations in (15).
Then, we define the structural error term as ωjt ≡ δjt(p, x, S; σ) + αpjt.
Supply
We discuss next identification of the model in subsection 2.2. We then present the estimation
procedure. For general supply identification and estimation arguments see DPPT (pp. 28-30
and appendix E).
Identification of supply. The supply is characterized by the equations in (4), (5), and (7).
A necessary and sufficient condition for identification of the supply-side parameters is that
the marginal cost of a given display format in a given month is the same whether the display
format is sold directly to the consumer or to a retailer (DPPT). Under that assumption,
equations in (4), (5), and (7) jointly identify the vectors of retail marginal costs, manufacturer
marginal costs, and bargaining weights.
The following assumptions, discussed below, simplify the supply model. They provide
sufficient conditions for identification. We later used them in the estimation routine.
Assumption 1. For each retailer, the retail marginal cost is zero. That is, let crj be the
retailer marginal cost of product j. Then, crj = 0 for all j ∈ Ωr and for all r = 1, . . . , R.
26
Assumption 2. For a given manufacturer, marginal costs of a display format do not vary
across retailers or direct sales. That is, call cmdj the marginal cost of of display format d sold
by manufacturer m to retailer j and cmdm the marginal cost of of display format d sold directly




dm for all (j, k) ∈ Ω
R
m and m ∈ Ω
D
m.
Assumption 3. For a given retailer, bargaining weights do not vary across manufacturers.
That is, λj = λk for all (j, k) ∈ Ωr.
These assumptions merit further discussion. The first assumption is reasonable in our
setting given the small retail margins observed in the data (see table 2).27 The assumption
allows us to omit the vector of retailer marginal costs in the supply-side analysis (estimation
and counterfactual analysis). Regarding assumption 2, for a manufacturer, the physical display
formats and services offered in both channels are the same. Any potential cost difference
is due to fixed costs. Assumption 3 is related to the nature of the data in the empirical
setting studied, as explained below. Assumptions 2 and 3 reduce respectively the dimension
of the vectors of manufacturer marginal costs and bargaining weights. Assumptions 1 to
3 have implications for identification (discussed next) and for estimation (discussed in the
next subsection). For identification, they allow to identify the supply-side parameters using
26This assumption is implicit in the formulation of the profit of the retailers, as noted in footnote 15.
27 We have performed the estimation without this assumption and obtained retailers’ marginal costs that
were very close to zero.
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equation (7) alone (instead of using equations 4, 5, and 7 as in DPPT). First, one can omit
equation (4) to compute the structural error term (equation 16 below; equation 18 in DPPT).
Intuitively, assumption 1 (zero retail costs) allows to omit equation (4), defining the necessary
first-order conditions of the retailers. Alternatively, equation (4) can be used jointly with
equation (7) to recover the retailer marginal costs (see footnote 27). Second, assumptions
2 and 3 allow us to omit equation (5) defining the necessary first-order conditions of the
manufacturers for their direct sales. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, the manufacturer
marginal costs in the second and third terms in equation (5) are, respectively, the ones in the
last two terms in equation (7) due to assumption 2. On the other, the system in (7) defines a
system of M ×R equations for each market t and display format. This system “just identifies”
the vectors of manufacturer marginal costs and bargaining weights. The vector of manufacturer
marginal costs have dimension 1×M (assumption 2), while the vector of bargaining parameters
have dimension 1 × R (assumption 3). Example 4 illustrates the identification argument in
one market with two manufacturers, two retailers, and one display format.
Example 4. Identification of supply-side parameters in one market with two
manufacturers, two retailers, and one display format.
There are two manufacturers, two retailers, one display format, and one market. Both
manufacturers also sell their products directly to consumers. Both retailers bargain with
both manufacturers. Denote the manufacturers by M1 and M2, the direct sales from those
manufacturers by R1 and R2, and the retailers by R3 and R4. There are 6 products in this













is the product sold directly by manufacturer M1, j
R
13 is the product manufactured by M1
























24}. Index final prices in a similar
form, being pfkl the final price for product j
f
kl ∈ J with f ∈ {R,D}. Next, index
accordingly wholesale prices, wkl; market shares, s
f
kl(p); marginal costs ckl, bargaining
weights λkl, and change in shares, ∆s
f
i,−j(p). Recall that the change in shares is defined


















































































Using assumption 1, c13 = c14 = c11 ≡ c1 because (j13, j14) ∈ Ω
R
M1




and c22 = c23 = c24 ≡ c2 because (j23, j24) ∈ Ω
R
M2
and c22 ∈ Ω
D
M2
. Using assumption 2,
λ13 = λ23 ≡ λ3 because (j13, j23) ∈ ΩR3 , λ14 = λ24 ≡ λ4 because (j14, j24) ∈ ΩR4 . The
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system of equations in (6) simplifies to a system of 4 equations in 4 unknowns, c1, c2,
λ3, and λ4.
28
A similar argument to the one in example 4 can be used for multiple manufacturers and
retailers. Consider the necessary first-order condition of the bargaining between a given man-
ufacturer with two retailers. Using assumption 2, the only difference in parameters are the
bargaining weights, as can be seen in equation (7). Then, the variation between these two
equations identifies the bargaining weights of the retailers vis-à-vis this manufacturer. Next,
consider the necessary first-order condition of the bargaining between a given retailer with
two different manufacturers. Using assumption 3, the variation in these equations allows us to
identify the different marginal costs for these manufacturers. Also due to assumption 3, the
marginal costs of the products sold to consumers directly are the same as the manufacturer
marginal costs of selling those products to the retailers. All manufacturer marginal costs and
bargaining weights are thus identified.
Estimation of supply. We estimate the supply-side parameters conditional on the demand
estimates. Assumptions 1 to 3 simplify the computational burden of the supply side for
the estimation and counterfactual analysis. They reduce the dimensionality of the supply
parameters. The total number of final products in a given market is given Jt = Dt × Mt ×
(Rt). Under the maintained assumption of constant parameters across markets, the vectors of
stacked retail marginal costs (cr), manufacturer marginal costs (cm), and bargaining weights
(λ) have each dimension J-by-1, for a total of 3×J supply-side parameters. Under assumptions
1 to 3, the number of total parameters is reduced to 0+M+R ≪ 3×J , where the summands on
the left-hand side represent respectively the numbers of parameters for the vectors of stacked
retail marginal costs, manufacturer marginal costs, and bargaining weights.29
The system of equations in (7) defines marginal costs implicitly as a function of the bar-
gaining parameters, cm = M(λ) by applying the implicit function theorem to (7). Instead of
numerically solving for the marginal costs in (7), we stack equations (5) and (7) which allows
us to use matrix inversion to obtain closed-form solutions of the marginal costs as a function
28An important question that arises is whether this system of equations has a unique solution that is
sensible economically. (Being sensible economically in our setting means that marginal costs are nonnegative
and bargaining weights lie between 0 and 1.) Such uniqueness is necessary to guarantee identification of the
supply model. We have used a variety of methods, solvers, and starting values and have always obtained
convergence to the same solution. However, we have not proved uniqueness (of economically sensible solution)
of the system.
29As discussed above, assumptions 1 to 3 are not necessary for identification. They simplify the supply-side
computational burden. On the one hand, they reduce the number of parameters to estimate. The estimation
routine is simpler and the parameters are more precisely estimated. The latter is important in the empirical
setting studied given the nature of the data aggregated at the market level. On the other hand, the assumptions
ease the computation of the counterfactual analysis. Solving for the equilibrium prices downstream is a difficult
problem. It entails solving an implicit nonlinear system of J = 57 equations in J unknowns, the downstream
vector prices pD and pR. We performed several robustness tests of our model. We also tested different
specifications of the supply model. The implications discussed in section 4 are robust. Results are available
upon request.
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of bargaining weights, cm = M(λ).30 We then make the standard parametrization of marginal
costs: cjt = x
S
jtγ + ǫ̂jt, where x
S
jt includes manufacturer and months/markets fixed effects, γ
is the corresponding vector of parameters, and ǫ̂jt is an unobservable error term. Rearranging
terms write the supply unobservable error term as:
ǫ̂(λ, γ) = M(λ)− xSγ, (16)
where variables without subscripts denote the corresponding stacked vectors of parameters.
We estimate the supply parameters by GMM using the moment condition E[Zs′ · ǫ̂(λ∗, γ∗)] =
0, where Zs is a matrix of supply-side instruments described next, ǫ̂(·) is the error term de-
fined in equation (16), and (λ∗, γ∗) is the true value of the supply parameters. For the supply
instruments, Zs, we use the average price of a product in other markets as an instrument for
that price of the same product in a given market. We also include in Zs manufacturer, month,
and retailer fixed effects. The identifying assumption is that the prices of a product in other
markets are uncorrelated with the marginal cost shock after accounting for the manufacturer,
month, and retailer fixed effects. The power of the instrument comes from the prices of a
product in other markets being correlated with the price of the product in the given market
through the bargaining equations in (7).
3.3 Results
Demand Estimates. The estimated demand parameters are presented in table 3 using the
following specifications of the model: (1) a simple logit model (without instruments for price,
without random coefficients for price); (2) a simple logit model with instruments for price
(without random coefficients for price); and (3) the full model, corresponding to the mixed
logit model described in subsection 2.1. All the specifications include a set of dummy variables
for manufacturers, retailers, display formats, and months fixed effects. The instruments are
described in subsection 3.2. The estimation algorithm from subsection 3.2 is applied to each
model with the obvious modifications. For example, for the simple logit without instruments,
model 1, the structural error in the system of equations in (15) has a closed-form expression
and the model is estimated by OLS. The demand estimates do not impose the equilibrium
conditions from the supply side.
The demand estimates are sensible in magnitude and sign, and are precisely estimated. By
comparing models 1 and 2, one can see the role of price endogeneity on the demand estimates.
The price coefficient doubles in absolute terms when we instrument for price. By comparing
models 2 and 3, one can see the importance of consumer heterogeneity for price. The dispersion
of the price sensitivity across consumers is statistically different from zero and relatively large
in magnitude. The mean price coefficient in model 3 is 0.42 and is statistically different from
zero. This result indicates that demand is relatively elastic. The average own-price elasticity
30See appendix B for details.
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is -1.66. We use the results from model 3 for the remainder of the paper.
Supply Estimates. Table 4 displays the results. The estimated parameters are sensible.
They are consistent with the ones in DPPT. Panel A shows the distribution of estimated
manufacturer marginal costs. Manufacturers’ marginal cost are relatively low in the industry
studied. The mean marginal cost, 4.8 Euros, is about half the mean wholesale price obtained
from the data, which is 8.2 Euros in table 2. There is a relatively large variation in marginal
costs across manufacturers conditional on display formats and markets. The coefficient of
variation is 0.8 (3.72/4.78). This result indicates that heterogeneities across manufacturers are
important and reflects the heterogeneities in manufacturers’ margins.
Panel B displays the estimates from the bargaining weights. Retailers have low bargaining
power, 0.1 on average, relative to a bargaining power of 0.9 on average for manufacturers.
Retailers rv8 and r
v
5 have the largest bargaining weights, 0.2 and 0.1, respectively.
Two observations suggest these numbers are consistent with the large concentration at the
manufacturer level, the low retail margins, and the large heterogeneities at the retail level
in the empirical setting. First, the largest manufacturer has nearly 50 percent of the sales;
retailers have little bargaining power when negotiating with it.
Second, retail margins are low; the median (mean) margin of the retailers is 0.57 (1.72)
Euros per square meter. To gain intuition regarding the relationship between bargaining







where the approximation in (17) is due to firms selling multiple products.31 In words, the
ratio of bargaining weights is approximately equal to the ratio of retailer margins relative
to manufacturer margins. In our setting, the ratio λj/(1−λj) has median (mean) of 7.5 (7.6)
percent, while the the ratio of retailer margins relative to manufacturer margins has median
(mean) of 7.7 (10.5) percent.
4 The Welfare Effects of Direct-to-Consumer Sales
Next we use the estimated model to examine the effect of direct sales on negotiated prices and
consumer welfare.
4.1 Welfare Scenarios and Measures
We simulate the counterfactual scenarios described below. We compare these scenarios to the
baseline where we use the estimated model with direct sales.
31It holds with equality for single-product firms. See equation (7) and Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas
(2010, equation 13).
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1. No bargaining leverage from direct sales: In this scenario, the direct-sales channel
continues to operate as in the baseline but we remove the manufactures’ bargaining
leverage due to the direct sales. We implement this scenario by setting dDj = 0 in
equation (7). In words, the manufacturers compete with retailers downstream but do
not internalize the profits from direct sales when negotiating wholesale prices with the
retailers.
2. No direct sales: In this scenario, we remove direct sales altogether. This scenario can
be conceptualized as a direct-sales prohibition, whereby manufacturers are not allowed
to sell directly to consumers.32 We implement this scenario by removing from the market
the products sold directly by the manufacturers in the baseline. Retailers in the vertical
sales channel continue offering the same set of products as in the baseline.
We implement the counterfactual analysis as follows. For each scenario above, we use the
equilibrium conditions given by the equations in (4), (5), and (7) to solve respectively for the
counterfactual consumer prices, market shares, and negotiated wholesale prices.
We report the following statistics: market shares disaggregated by direct and retail sales,
consumer prices disaggregated by direct sales and retail sales, negotiated wholesale prices,
profits of the retailers (Πr), and profits of the manufacturers (Πr) disaggregated by the part
coming from the direct sales channel (ΠDm) and vertical sales channel (Π
V
m). For the com-
putation of the profits of the retailers and manufacturers we use the formulas given by the
equations in (2) and (3), respectively. We report the compensating variation as a measure of












where E(·) denotes the expectation operator taken over the random shocks ǫijt and C is a
constant.
Consumer welfare for type i is the change in consumer surplus (or compensating variation,
CV ) that results in the scenario performed. We compute the difference between the consumer
surplus for consumer i in the baseline and in the counterfactual scenarios described above.
We compute the total consumer surplus as the weighted sum of E(CSi) using the weights










dPν(νi), j = 1, 2, (19)
where E(CV ) denotes the weighted sum across types of consumers of the compensating vari-
ation, the superscript 0 refers to the baseline, the superscripts j refer to the counterfactuals
32This counterfactual may have important policy consequences. For example, see our discussion in the
introduction about the Tesla’s case and the responses by the FTC and the DOJ.
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scenarios described above, and E(CSki ) is given by equation (18) for k = 0, 1, 2.
4.2 Results
Table 5 displays the estimates from the counterfactual analysis. The table shows the percent-
age change in the counterfactual scenarios relative to the baseline.
In counterfactual scenario 1, we remove the bargaining leverage of manufacturers from the
direct sales. When direct sales are present, manufacturers internalize in the negotiated whole-
sale prices the increase in profits due to direct sales in case that the negotiation fails. This
effect is captured by the term dDj in equation (7). It generates upward pressure on wholesale
prices. In equilibrium, however, wholesale prices are also affected by changes in downstream
prices because the latter affect both manufacturer and retailer gains-from-trade as can be
seen in equation (7). In scenario 1, we held constant competition and product variety at the
retail level. This feature allows us to isolate the leverage effect of manufacturers due to direct
sales. Negotiated wholesale prices should decrease unambiguously. Scenario 1 shows that they
decrease by 4 percent in the application studied; that is, direct sales increase manufacturers’
bargaining leverage allowing them to charge wholesale prices that are 4 percent higher. In the
downstream, the decrease in wholesale prices generate two effects. First, it reduces retailers’
cost, thus decreasing retail sales prices. Second, it induces manufacturers to reduce direct-sales
prices as indicated by the first-order condition (5). The reduction in consumer retail prices is
larger than the reduction in prices of the direct sales. Retail market shares increase substan-
tially, 12 percent, while direct-sales shares decline. The decrease in manufacturers’ profits by
approximately 1 percent reflects the culmination of two countervailing effects. Although the
direct channel profits decrease substantially by 3 percent (last term in equation 3), consumers
divert towards retail sales, thus increasing manufacturers vertical channel profits by 9 percent
(first term in equation 3). Direct channel profits represent 81 percent of the total profits of the
manufacturers in the baseline. Retailers profits increase substantially, 20 percent. Consumer
surplus increases by a relative small magnitude, 2 percent. Total welfare also increases. The
results are consistent with the economic intuition presented in examples 1 to 3.
In counterfactual scenario 2, we remove the direct-sales channel completely. In the down-
stream, there is a decrease in the number of products and competition. Retail prices increase
substantially by 26 percent. There is a net increase in wholesale prices by 2 percent. This
increase reflects two effects. First, there is a decrease in the manufacturers’ bargaining lever-
age because they no longer have direct sales. This effect generates downward pressure on
wholesale prices as discussed in counterfactual scenario 1. Second, without direct sales, there
are fewer products available to the consumer, thus reducing retail competition and increasing
all prices (including wholesale prices). This effect generates upward pressure on wholesale
prices (see equation 7). Table 5 shows that the latter effects dominates. The increase in retail
market shares arises because consumers divert from direct to retail products. Retailers are
the conspicuous winners from the direct-sales prohibition. Their profits increase substantially
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by 537 percent. It is a consequence of the large share of direct sales in the counterfactual con-
sidered. Although manufacturers’ vertical sales profits increase substantially, such increase
is insufficient to offset the reduction in profits due to direct sales. Overall, manufacturers’
profits decrease substantially by 54 percent. Consumer surplus and total welfare also decrease
substantially.
In sum, the counterfactual analysis sheds light on two fundamental economic issues. First,
it quantifies the magnitude of the leverage effect; that is, it measures the extent to which
direct sales increase manufacturers’ bargaining power when negotiating wholesale prices with
the retailers. Second, it quantifies the welfare effects of direct sales. We now examine the
relevance of the effects for the evaluation of vertical mergers.
4.3 Implications for Vertical Mergers
So far we conducted the analysis in terms of an oligopolistic producer’s decision of whether to
create a direct-to-consumer channel. The same economic principles apply to an oligopolistic
producer’s decision of whether to merge vertically; that is, to merge with a retailer.33 Next, we
discuss two effects that may emerge from a vertical merger, similar to those analyzed for the
creation of a direct-to-consumer channel.34 We finish with a discussion about the differences
between these two strategies.
Consider an industry where a few manufacturers supply a few retailers. Manufacturers sell
production factors to retailers. Retailers sell retail products to final consumers. Manufacturers
bargain first with retailers over wholesale prices; afterwards retailers set retail prices. Suppose
that a manufacturer merges with a retailer. First, we argue that a vertical merger increases
the bargaining leverage of the merged firm upstream; that is, the vertical merger increases the
bargaining power of the merged firm when negotiating with the retailers. Let us call this the
bargaining leverage effect.35
Suppose that the merged firm sells production factors to a rival retailer; that is, to a
retailer that competes with its own retailer. Before the merger, if the manufacturer of the
merging firm does not reach an agreement with the rival retailer, or if it refuses to supply
the retailer, the manufacturer loses the profit it would earn if it supplied the rival retailer.
If the rival retailer has no alternative equally competitive suppliers, it loses sales.36 Part of
the lost sales diverge to the retailer of the merged firm. After the merger, if the merged firm
33A vertical merger involves firms that operate at different levels of production and distribution. On June 30,
2020, the U.S. Department of Justice and The Federal Trade Commission updated their Vertical Merger Guide-
lines. The new version states that with respect to these transactions, there should not be a pro-competitive or
anti-competitive presumption. Vertical mergers should be evaluated case by case, on the basis of the facts of
the transaction. This perspective contrasts with that of the previous version of the guidelines, dated from 1968,
which assumed that vertical mergers were mostly neutral or pro-competitive. Vertical mergers are important,
e.g., in digital industries. See our discussion in the introduction.
34A vertical merger may involve additional effects; see, e.g., Riordan and Salop (1995).
35The economic principles of the bargaining leverage effect discussed in this section are similar to the
bargaining leverage over rivals (BLR) effect by Rogerson (2020). See our discussion in the related literature.
36If a retail rival does not find an alternative supplier, it loses the sales related to the reduction of supply of
the merged firm. If it finds a more expensive alternative supplier, it has to raise his price, thus losing sales.
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does not reach an agreement with the rival retailer, it still loses the profit it would earn if
supplied that firm. However, now it also earns the profits that result from the sales diverted
from the rival retailer. Thus, because it internalizes the sales diversion downstream, it is less
costly for the merged firm not to reach an agreement with a rival retailer than for the retailer
of the merged firms acting independently. This effect increases the bargaining power of the
merged firm and enables it to charge a higher price for the upstream product as in Rogerson
(2020). Given the increase of the upstream price of the merged firm, upstream rivals may
also increase their prices. These increases in upstream prices may lead to higher downstream
prices. Consequently, consumer surplus may decline.
A horizontal merger, by allowing the internalization of the diversion of sales between firms
that produce substitute products, increases the market power of the merged firm. Similarly,
if the merged firm sells production factors to rival retailers and if rival retailers that buy
production factors from the merged firm have no alternative equally competitive suppliers,
then a vertical merger by allowing the internalization of the diversion of sales between firms
that produce complementary products, increases upstream the market power of the merged
firm.
Second, a vertical merger may allow the merged firm to eliminate its upstream margin. Let
us call this the double marginalization effect.37 Suppose the manufacturer of the merged firm
sells production factors to the retailer of the merged firm. Before the merger, the manufacturer
and the retailer of the merged firm maximize independently their profits. If there is market
power upstream, the manufacturer charges a price above marginal cost. After the merger,
the merged firm maximizes the joint profit of its two components—the manufacturer and
the retailer—, and internalizes the increase in sales downstream caused by a decrease in the
upstream price. Hence, the merged firm assigns to the production factor a price equal to the
upstream marginal cost. The decrease in this price reduces the marginal cost of the retailer of
the merged firm, and allows it to charge a lower downstream price. Given the decrease of the
downstream price of the merged firm, the downstream rivals may respond by lowering their
prices. These price decreases may increase consumer surplus.
In terms of social welfare, the bargaining leverage and double marginalization effects op-
erate in opposite directions in the setting described. The net impact of the vertical merger on
welfare is thus ambiguous. The increase in bargaining power upstream, in conjunction with
the elimination of double marginalization, may give the merged firm a substantial strategic
advantage relative to its upstream and downstream rivals. Our main contribution here is to
shed light on how to isolate and quantify the bargaining leverage effect.
The bargaining leverage and the double marginalization effects are present in both the
creation of a direct-to-consumer channel and a vertical merger. The magnitude of these two
effects, however, may differ across these two strategies. The former effect will differ if the
new retailer and the retailer of the merged firm have different sizes and their products have
37This is the well known result when there are successive monopolies at two layers of production, and dates
back to Lerner (1934) (for further references see, e.g., Spengler 1950 and Tirole 1988, pp. 174-6).
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different degrees of substitutability with respect to that of the rival retailer. The latter effect
will differ, if the new retailer and the retailer of the merged firm have different marginal
costs.38 Furthermore, the creation of a direct-to-consumer channel involves an additional
effect: the creation of a new downstream brand. The resulting increase in competition and
product variety downstream benefit consumers. The creation of a direct-to-consumer channel
is socially preferable to a vertical merger, everything else constant.39 Nevertheless, as noted
above, the bargaining leverage and the double marginalization effects may differ across these
two strategies.
5 Concluding Remarks
We develop a model that incorporates direct-to-consumer sales by manufacturers to the
workhorse supply model where manufacturers and retailers bargain over wholesale prices.
We show that direct sales by manufacturers generate two effects that have opposing welfare
implications. First, direct sales generate potential welfare gains to consumers due to additional
competition and product variety downstream. Second, there is an increase in the bargaining
leverage of the manufacturers selling directly to consumers. We show that the additional bar-
gaining leverage due to direct sales increases the negotiated wholesale prices, thus increasing
final prices to consumers and decreasing consumer welfare.
We show how our model can be used to measure these effects. To that end, we estimate
our model using a unique dataset from the outdoor advertising industry, where direct sales
have been a steady feature. We use the estimated model to simulate counterfactual scenarios
assessing the role of direct sales on prices and welfare.
We discuss two main findings from the empirical application. First, direct sales increase
manufacturers’ bargaining leverage allowing them to increase wholesale prices by 4 percent.
The additional bargaining leverage decreases the profits of the retailers substantially by 20
percent. Consumer welfare is reduced due to the resulting increase in consumer retail prices.
Second, direct sales generates an overall large increase in both consumer welfare and manufac-
turers profits in our application, 59 percent and 43 percent, respectively. The share of direct
sales in the industry is an important factor influencing the magnitude of the estimates.
We conclude discussing the relevance of the bargaining leverage effect for vertical mergers.
For vertical mergers the bargaining leverage and double marginalization effects operate in op-
posite directions in terms of welfare. We argue about the importance of specifying a flexible
supply model that allows one to measure the additional bargaining leverage that a manufac-
turer may obtain when merging with a retailer. Our model allows for such quantification.
Measuring the additional bargaining leverage of manufacturers due to a merger adds another
layer of consideration for vertical merger evaluation.
38Creating a new firm involves irreducible uncertainty regarding consumer preferences and efficiency.
39This assertion is plausible, if creating a direct-to-consumer channel, i.e., creating a retailer, does not
involve substantial costs, and if merging with a retailer involves small costs.
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Table 1: Market Shares by Manufacturer, Retailer, and Display Format.
Seller 2 m2 panel Senior Other
Total Total by seller
m1 m2 m3 m4 m1 m2 m3 m4 m1 m2 m3 m4
Retailers
rv4 0.69 0.61 0.16 – – 0.91 0.06 – – – 0.19 1.52 4.14
55.43
rv5 0.35 0.72 0.18 – – 0.09 0.15 0.11 – – 0.10 0.51 2.22
rv6 2.16 2.08 0.63 0.91 – 1.38 0.12 – – – 0.07 2.56 9.91
rv7 0.93 2.23 0.44 0.18 – 0.69 0.29 – – 0.08 0.36 8.62 13.83
rv8 0.12 0.14 – – – 0.72 0.10 – – 0.03 0.14 – 1.25
rv9 4.51 11.43 2.47 0.06 0.02 3.79 0.34 0.10 0.01 0.32 1.01 0.04 24.09
rd1 0.99 – – – – – – – – – – – 0.99
Direct Sales rd2 – 3.32 – – – 2.27 – – – 0.14 – – 5.73 9.65
rd3 – – 1.05 – – – 0.14 – – – 1.76 – 2.94
Total 9.74 20.53 4.92 1.15 0.02 9.85 1.21 0.21 0.01 0.56 3.62 13.25 65.09
Total by display 36.35 11.29 17.45 65.09
Notes: Each cell corresponds to the percentage of sales to consumers (relative to the market size defined as twenty percent greater than the maximum observed total monthly sales for the year
2013) across all months in the sample by the corresponding combination of Manufacturer, Seller (Retailers and Direct Sales), and Display Format. A cell displays the symbol “–” when no sales
are observed for such combination. In Panel B there are a total of 57 cells with positive sales (i.e without the symbol “–”), that corresponds to the 57 inside products.
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Table 2: Prices by Manufacturer, Seller, and Display Format.
Wholesale prices Retail prices
Mean Mean St. Dev. Min. Median Max. Mean Mean St. Dev. Min. Median Max.
unweighted weighted unweighted weighted
Manufacturer:
- m1 13.7 9.4 13.5 1.4 9.8 73.4 14.2 8.8 14.7 1.5 9.7 78.4
- m2 18.7 11.2 23.4 1.0 11.7 247.3 19.0 10.3 20.0 1.1 12.1 132.1
- m3 21.9 6.7 31.2 0.4 8.5 163.8 23.3 6.4 33.9 0.6 8.3 172.0
- m4 15.2 1.9 13.5 0.4 13.6 75.2 16.1 2.0 14.3 0.4 14.4 79.0
Seller:
- rv4 18.0 5.5 28.1 0.5 7.5 148.6 18.5 5.7 28.8 0.5 7.8 153.6
- rv5 22.4 10.1 23.3 0.9 13.7 124.6 25.0 11.0 27.2 0.9 14.4 172.0
- rv6 11.9 2.9 26.2 0.7 4.4 163.8 12.6 3.0 27.3 0.7 4.6 170.0
- rv7 13.6 3.6 14.3 0.4 8.2 79.5 14.2 3.7 14.9 0.4 8.6 81.5
- rv8 25.7 6.4 30.9 0.4 14.5 158.1 29.9 7.3 34.3 0.6 16.9 165.8
- rv9 22.8 11.8 25.9 2.3 15.7 247.3 21.7 10.2 21.0 1.2 14.8 132.1
- rd1 – – – – – – 13.3 12.4 3.3 9.4 12.0 19.0
- rd2 – – – – – – 19.8 14.1 17.9 1.4 15.2 66.9
- rd3 – – – – – – 8.8 6.5 4.9 2.7 7.9 23.0
Display:
- 2 m2 panel 11.3 9.8 11.7 0.8 8.4 79.5 11.8 9.1 12.3 0.9 8.7 83.2
- Senior 20.9 10.0 28.2 1.0 13.5 163.8 21.4 9.5 29.5 1.1 13.1 170.0
- Other 25.6 3.5 29.3 0.4 17.1 247.3 27.2 3.4 28.8 0.4 20.7 172.0
All Products: 18.4 8.2 24.2 0.4 10.3 247.3 19.3 7.7 24.7 0.4 10.5 172.0
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for wholesale and retail prices for each manufacturer, retailer, and display format. Unweighted prices correspond to the mean using equal weights.
Weighted prices correspond to the mean using the corresponding market shares as weights. Prices are in Euros per m2.
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Table 3: Demand Estimates.
Logit OLS Logit GMM Mixed Logit
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error
Price:
- Mean (α) 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.42 0.01
- St. dev. (σ) − − − − 0.15 0.03
Manufacturer dummy variables:
- Manufacturer m1 -0.48 0.21 -0.39 0.25 -0.76 0.28
- Manufacturer m2 0.90 0.18 1.05 0.21 1.14 0.24
- Manufacturer m3 -0.20 0.18 0.16 0.21 -0.65 0.24
Seller dummy variables:
- Retailer rv4 0.58 0.46 0.60 0.53 1.14 0.60
- Retailer rv5 -0.41 0.21 -0.55 0.24 -1.84 0.27
- Retailer rv6 -0.74 0.20 -0.62 0.23 -0.53 0.26
- Retailer rv7 0.20 0.29 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.38
- Retailer rv8 -0.21 0.20 -0.51 0.24 -2.46 0.27
- Retailer rv9 0.34 0.30 -0.36 0.37 -0.75 0.41
- Direct sales rd2 -0.19 0.19 -0.47 0.23 -1.13 0.25
- Direct sales rd3 -1.56 0.22 -1.32 0.26 -1.71 0.29
Product dummy variables:
- 2 m2 panel 0.77 0.15 0.23 0.2 0.08 0.23
- Senior -0.44 0.15 -0.70 0.18 -0.92 0.20
Number of observations 684 684 684
Notes: Estimates of selected parameters from the demand model in subsection 2.1. All specifications include dummy variables for manufacturers, sellers/retailers, display format, and months
fixed effects (not reported). Model 1 is estimated by OLS. Model 2 and 3 are estimated by GMM. Details about the estimation procedure and the instruments are in subsection 3.2. See subsection
3.1 for details about the data.
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Table 4: Supply Estimates.
Statistic or Retailer Estimate













Notes: Estimates of selected parameters from the demand model in subsection 2.2. All specifications include dummy variables
for manufacturers, sellers/retailers, and months fixed effects. Details about the estimation procedure and the instruments are in
subsection 3.2. See subsection 3.1 for details about the data.
36
Table 5: Counterfactual Scenarios.
Percentage change
Manufacturers do not have:
Bargaining leverage
Direct sales
relative to baseline in: from direct sales
(1) (2)
Market Shares
- Direct sales share -2.33 -100.00
- Retail sales share 12.47 173.87
Consumer prices
- Direct sales prices -0.67 -
- Retail sales prices -2.95 26.17
Wholesale prices -3.98 2.07
Profits
- Manufacturers’ profits -0.80 -54.40
- Direct channel profits -3.07 -100.00
- Vertical channel profits 8.61 135.01
- Retailers’ profits 20.46 536.56
Consumer surplus 1.93 -58.61
Total welfare 0.77 -43.37
Notes: The table displays counterfactual scenarios using the estimated model. All numbers in the table represent the percentage
change in the counterfactual relative to the baseline. The baseline corresponds to the estimated model with direct sales, tables
3 (model 3) and 4. In counterfactual scenario 1 (no bargaining leverage from direct sales), the direct-sales channel continues to
operate as in the baseline but we remove the manufactures’ bargaining leverage due to the direct sales (dDj = 0 in equation 7).
In counterfactual scenario 2 (no direct sales), manufacturers’ direct-sales are prohibited. See subsection 4.1 for details about the
implementation of the counterfactuals. See section 2 for definitions of the market shares, prices, and profits. See subsection 4.1
for the definition of consumer surplus.
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Appendix
A Derivation of Bargaining Equations
A.1 Derivation of equation (6)












Because manufacturers and retailers take prices set to consumers as fixed when determining
wholesale prices, we have ∂Πm
∂wj
= sRj M and
∂Πr
∂wj
= −sRj M . Substituting above and simplifying
with sRj > 0 yields:
λj(Πm − Πm,−j) + (1− λj)(Πr − Πr,−j)(−1) = 0. (A.1)
Reorganizing yields equation (6).
A.2 Derivation of equation (7)
Substituting the profit functions, from the equations in (2) and (3), and the disagreement




















































































 = 0, (A.2)




k(p), with f ∈ {R,D}.
Isolating wjsj(p) yields equation (7).
40To simplify the notation here, we simply write the retailers’ profits as Πr instead of Πr(w,w−j), and Πr,−j
instead of Πr,−j(w−j). We also adopt the corresponding notational convention for manufacturers.
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B Derivation of the Estimating Marginal Cost Equation
B.1 Derivation of the term cm = M(λ) in equation (16)
Write in matrix form equation (5) for the necessary first-order conditions of the manufacturers
from their direct sales:41
s+ (Tw ⊙∆s)(w − c




1 if i = j or (i ∧ j) are owned by the same manufacturer
0 otherwise,
∆s is the matrix of derivatives with respect to price,
w is a M×R vector such that wj = p
D
j if j is a product sold directly by manufacturers.
Similarly, write in matrix form equation (7) for the necessary first-order conditions of the
wholesale bargaining prices in the vertical channel:
(Tw ⊙ s̄)(w − c
m).λ− (Tr ⊙ s̄)(p
R − w).(1− λ) = 0, (B.2)
where:
s̄ is such that s̄(i, j) =
{
sj if i = j
-∆s−ji otherwise,
Tr is such that Tr(i, j) =
{
1 if i = j or (i ∧ j) are sold by the same retailer
0 otherwise.
Next, sum the equations in (B.1) and (B.2) as follows:
Id[s+ (Tw ⊙∆s)(w − c
m)] + Iv[(Tw ⊙ s̄)(w − c
m).λ− (Tr ⊙ s̄)(p
R − w).(1− λ)] = 0, (B.3)
where:
Id is a J×J matrix such that Id(i, j) =
{
1 if i = j and product j is sold directly
0 otherwise,
Iv is a J×J matrix such that Iv(i, j) =
{
1 if i = j and product j is sold by retailers
0 otherwise.
Finally, let:
cm = M(λ) ≡ A−1(λ)B(λ), (B.4)
where:
A(λ) = Iv(Tw ⊙ s̄).λ+ Id(Tw ⊙∆s),
B(λ) = Iv[(Tw ⊙ s̄)w.λ− (Tr ⊙ s̄)(p
R − w).(1− λ)] + Id(s+ (Tw ⊙∆s)w).




Example 5. No direct sales from one manufacturer.



























































(b) Only M1 sells directly to con-
sumers.
Notes: The figure illustrates the leverage effect of one manufacturer with two manufacturers and one retailer from example 5.
Panel a. In the upstream, manufacturers M1 and M2 produce, respectively, inputs 1 and 2 at costs c1 and c2. These inputs are




the downstream, there are three competing firms, M1, M2, and R1. Manufacturers M1 and M2 sell, respectively, products jD1
and jD
2












Panel b. Similar to panel a, but now manufacturer M2 does not sell products jD2 to consumers.
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Example 6. No direct sales from both manufacturers.






















































(b) Neither M1 nor M2 sell directly to
consumers.
Notes: The figure illustrates the leverage effect of one manufacturer with two manufacturers and one retailer from example 6.
Panel a. In the upstream, manufacturers M1 and M2 produce, respectively, inputs 1 and 2 at costs c1 and c2. These inputs are




the downstream, there are three competing firms, M1, M2, and R1. Manufacturers M1 and M2 sell, respectively, products jD1
and jD
2


















Example 7. Direct sales vs. vertical integration.
























































(b) M1 vertically integrates with R1.
Notes: The figure illustrates the leverage effect of one manufacturer with two manufacturers and one retailer from example 7.
Panel a. In the upstream, manufacturers M1 and M2 produce, respectively, inputs 1 and 2 at costs c1 and c2. These inputs are




the downstream, there are three competing firms, M1, M2, and R1. Manufacturers M1 and M2 sell, respectively, products jD1
and jD
2












Panel b. Similar to panel a, but now the dashed red line denotes vertical integration between M1 and R1. The vertically integrated




to consumers at prices pR
1
and pR
2
, respectively
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